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Impact of Strategic Behavior and Ownership
of Energy Storage on Provision of Flexibility
Karl Hartwig, Student Member, IEEE, and Ivana Kockar, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Energy storage systems (ESS) are expected to provide
additional flexibility to managed variable power flows in future
power systems. It is believed that the business case for ESS
as an alternative to traditional network reinforcements can be
improved, if the assets are able to access additional revenue
streams by participating in energy and ancillary services markets.
To enable this, the storage may need to be operated by private
merchants to circumvent the unbundling principle applied in elec-
tricity markets today. However, it is not clear if the right incentives
are in place for these entities to operate the ESS in a way that
provides the required flexibility and supports the wider system
benefits sought by the system operator (SO). This work seeks to
evaluate the impact of strategic behavior of an independent trader
operating ESS in a nodal electricity market. The results indicated
that a strategic bidder operating ESS tends to underuse the assets
leading to suboptimal solution in terms of market welfare, as well
as congestion and curtailment reduction, removing some of the
potential benefits the ESS can provide to the power system.
Index Terms—Bi-level programming, energy storage,
ownership, offering strategy, price-based market clearing.
NOMENCLATURE
A. Indices and Sets
e ESS index running from 1 to E
t, r Time period indices running from 1 to T
i Power producer index running from 1 to I
j Strategic producer index running from 1
to J
n, m Node indices running from 1 to N and 1
to M
b Producer cost segment running from 1
to B
ψn Set of generators and ESS connected to
bus n
θn Set of buses connected to bus n
B. Constants
Cgib Cost of energy block b of producers i
Csjb Cost of energy block b of strategic pro-
ducer j
P g
min
ib , P
gmax
ib Limits of block b for producer i
P s
min
jb , P
smax
jb Limits of block b for strategic producer j
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P ess
max
e Maximum discharge rate of ESS e
Pmaxnm Transfer capacity between buses n and m
Bnm Susceptance between buses n and m
SoCmine Minimum state of charge of ESS e
SoCmaxe Maximum state of charge of ESS e
SoC0e Initial state of charge of ESS e
εoute , ε
in
e Discharging and charging efficiency of
ESS e
δminn , δ
max
n Voltage angle limits at bus n
P dtn Demand at bus n during time t
∆t Time interval between time periods
M Large constant used during linearization
C. Primary Decision Variables
βchrgte Offer price for ESS e at time t
βdiste Bid price for ESS e at time t
βstjb Bid price block b strategic producer j at t
P gtib Output block b producer i at time t
P stjb Output block b strategic producer j at
time t
PEbidte , P
Eoffer
te Energy bid and offer of ESS e at time t
P diste , P
chrg
te Discharging and charging of ESS e at
time t
δtn Voltage angle at bus n at time t
D. Dual Decision Variables
µg
min
tib , µ
gmax
tib Limit of block b for producer i at time t
µs
min
tjb , µ
smax
tjb Limit of block b for strategic producer j
at time t
µdis
min
te , µ
dismax
te Limits of ESS e discharge at time t
µchrg
min
te , µ
chrgmax
te Limits of ESS e charging at time t
µδ
min
tn , µ
δmax
tn Voltage angle limits at bus n at time t
µl
min
tnm, µ
lmax
tnm Transfer limits between bus n and m at
time t
λtn Nodal power balance/LMP at bus n at
time t
λreft Reference bus constraint in period t
E. Binary Indicator Variables
Ig
min
tib , I
gmax
tib Limit of block b for producer i at time t
Is
min
tjb , I
smax
tjb Limit of block b for strategic producer j
at t
Idis
min
te , I
dismax
te Limits of ESS e discharge at time t
Ichrg
min
te , I
chrgmax
te Limits of ESS e charging at time t
I l
min
tnm, I
lmax
tnm Limit of the line between buses n and m
at time t
Iδ
min
tn , I
δmax
tn Limits of voltage angle at bus n at
time t
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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE continuing growth in Renewable Energy Sources(RES) as well as electrification of transport and heating
introduces new challenges to electrical power system operation
and balancing. Energy Storage Systems (ESS) are expected to
become important tools for providing the flexibility required to
mitigate these problems, yet it is unclear what ownership struc-
tures are best suited to ensure the potential benefits are realized
by the system.
ESS can be owned by Network Operators (NO) and
used as an alternative to traditional grid re-enforcements in
Active Network Management (ANM) schemes. However, the
unbundling principle applied in most electricity markets today
prohibits NO owned ESS to participate in electricity markets to
access additional revenue streams during times it is not required
for constraint management [1]. This may lead to underutiliza-
tion of the assets and creates a case for privately owned storage
that would be able to participate in ancillary services, energy
markets, and sign contracts with the NO for any additional ser-
vices it may provide [2]. Alternative solutions have also been
proposed to circumvent the unbundling principle by allowing
the NO to own the ESS and lease it to a third party during times
it is not required for network security [3].
When ESS are operated by private merchants it is not clear
whether the right incentives are in place for these to dispatch
the storage in a way that supports the wider system welfare.
The work presented here seeks to explore this by investigating
the impact of strategic operation of transmission connected ESS
in nodal energy markets.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
• Identification of conflicting interests between private ESS
merchants operating ESS, and the SO.
• Evaluation of the impact of strategic ESS bidding of inde-
pendent merchants, on the wider social benefits through
the Price of Anarchy (PoA) associated with selfish ESS
operator behavior.
• Evaluating the impact of considering price formation
when dispatching ESS to maximize market welfare.
• Investigate the impact of co-optimization of ESS and
strategic generators on the market welfare.
• Investigate the likely spread of welfare lost quantified by
PoA over a wide spread of system conditions by a Monte
Carlo Simulation (MCS) approach.
Results of this research could inform regulators on how
different ownership arrangements can impact various market
participants, including ESS owners, as well as system oper-
ation. Thus, the above analyses can provide regulators with
critical assessment of what is the influence of ESS and vari-
ous ownership arrangements on market outcomes and identify
if there are any issues that may need to be addressed through
regulation and/or market design.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces
background of previous analysis of ESS bidding strategies
and behavior in electricity markets followed by the problem
formulation and proposed methodology used in this work in
Section III. Section IV and V describe the test cases used for the
analysis carried out in this work including the obtained results.
Finally, the conclusions drawn from the work are presented in
Section VI.
II. IMPACT OF ESS OWNERSHIP AND STRATEGIC BIDDING
The impact of ESS ownership on market welfare has received
limited interest in the published literature. Models for hourly
scheduling of centralized and distributed ESS in day–ahead
electricity markets are presented in [4], where the centralized
ESS is modelled as a total cost minimization and assumes
System Operator (SO) control. The control of distributed stor-
age, on the other hand, only strives to minimize the cost of
serving local load based on anticipated hourly market prices.
Both models are represented through Mixed Integer Linear
Programming (MILP) and the ESS is considered a price taker.
The results show that the centrally controlled ESS provides
greater savings to system operation cost compared to the
decentralized approach.
Analysis that identifies conflicts of interest between a
Distribution System Operator (DSO) and independent ESS
operators are conducted in [5] using a simplistic Linear
Program (LP). The energy trader’s objective to maximize prof-
its resulted in a reduction in RES utilization and increased
peak load whereas the DSO operation with the objective to
reduce peak load had the opposite effects. To solve the con-
flicts, cooperative operation of the ESS is proposed where the
trader operates the ESS with additional constraints to limit peak
load.
Optimal bidding of privately owned storage systems in elec-
tricity markets has, to certain extent, been previously investi-
gated. For example, optimal bidding of ESS in the Californian
electricity market is investigated in [6] considering uncertainty
in day ahead and real time market prices and their correlation.
The problem is modelled through non-linear stochastic opti-
mization and is decomposed into inner and outer sub- problems
to facilitate finding feasible solutions. An alternative formu-
lation is presented that includes consideration of conditional
value at risk in the objective function to enable risk adverse
bidding.
In [7] the profit maximization of a group of storage units
that participate in providing energy and reserve capacity in a
day-ahead market as well as energy in a real time market is
investigated. A stochastic programming approach is used to
take into account the price uncertainty induced by renewable
power. The formulation considers the uncertainty in dispatched
reserve and the possibility to sell unused State of Charge (SoC),
allocated to reserve, later in the energy market.
The analysis above assumes that the ESS is a price taker and
has negligible influence on the market price formation. Even
though this is a reasonable assumption to make when compar-
ing ESS of a few MW to the entire transmission grid, it may
not capture the effect of potential ESS market power in power
systems where physical constraints reduce local competition.
The behavior of pumped hydro storage bidding under mar-
ket power is investigated through stochastic MILP in [8]–[10].
The approach is extended further in [11] to include manage-
ment of risk by conditional value at risk (CVaR) and suggestion
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of appropriate offering strategies for different risk levels based
on this. The impact of the storage units on market price and
interaction with other market participants is modelled through
residual demand curves. The results shown in [8]–[11], based
on single level optimization that is not able to model the impact
of network congestion on prices, show that the ESS withholds
some of its available capacity when operated strategically to not
negatively influence market prices and in this way maximize
profits.
A number of publish studies apply game theory to evaluate
the effects of potential strategic operation of ESS with market
power. A supply function equilibrium model is applied in the
form of a Stackelberg game in [12] to evaluate effect of ESS
ownership on the ability to increase the value of wind energy
and market welfare. The offering strategy is determined over a
24 hour time horizon whereas no account is taken of network
or generator constraints other than storage energy capacity. The
results show that a wind generator having access to ESS can
co-optimize its operation to increase profits with the side effect
of a net decrease in profits of competing generators and a drop
in consumer surplus. Similar effects on market welfare were
found when the ESS was operated by an independent merchant
to perform price arbitrage.
In [13] historic market data from the Electric Reliability
Council of Texas (ERCOT) is applied to a Cournot game model
to explore the effects of strategic ESS operation and ownership
on market welfare. The model is limited to only examine two
time periods representing off-peak and on-peak demand. No
account is made for generator constraints or network topology,
with the exception of storage maximum rate of charge and dis-
charge. The analysis shows that strategic ESS dispatch always
results in suboptimal welfare regardless of ownership. This is
due to incentives for generators and energy traders to underuse
the ESS to prohibit drop in price volatility that would reduce the
arbitrage opportunity. The opposite effect is noticed when con-
sumers operate the storage as it is in the consumers interest to
drive prices downwards. Similar conclusions are drawn in [14]
where the effects on pumped hydro storage profits and market
welfare is explored in a German energy market using real mar-
ket price data. Yet, the study also shows that a net increase in
welfare is always achieved by introducing ESS to the system,
even if ESS dispatch is suboptimal with regards to welfare.
Conditions where ESS dispatch reduces market welfare are
investigated in [15] using a similar approach as [13]. Lemmas
are derived that support the claim that ESS dispatch will never
result in lower market welfare compared to when no ESS is
installed in the system as long as there is sufficient competition
among conventional generators in the market. Nevertheless, it
is concluded that strategic ESS operation will result in reduced
welfare compared to a perfectly competitive market and this
effect can further reduce welfare if conventional generators in
the same market bid strategically.
Optimal strategic bidding for price maker flexible demand
(deferrable loads with deadlines) in a two stage settlement mar-
ket (energy and balancing) is investigated in [16] through a
stochastic MILP formulation. The impact on market price for-
mation is calculated by comparing the estimated demand and
procured flexible demand with the equilibria of supply and
demand bid/offer curves.
Although capturing some aspects of strategic ESS bidding,
none of the work described above take into account the effect
of network congestion on price formation. This is important
as such effects can significantly alter the ability of the ESS to
influence Locational Marginal Price (LMP) in nodal markets.
Contrary to previous work, [17] explicitly takes into account
the effect of network constraints on ESS strategic bidding.
This is done through the formulation of a Stackelberg game in
the form of a bi-level optimization problem where the lower
level market clearing is formulated as a network constrained
DC-Optimum Power Flow (DC-OPF). This approach has been
used previously in energy markets to model the contradicting
interests of the power producers and Market Operator (MO)
[18]–[23].
The analysis of [17] take a similar approach as [23] to investi-
gate the ability of the MPEC to maximize the profits of a storage
owner operating a number of large scale ESS in a nodal elec-
tricity market. Whereas the ability of the proposed MPEC to
maximize ESS profits is investigated together with a compari-
son of the resulting Locational Marginal Price (LMP) to a case
without storage in the system, the results are not compared to
alternative ways of dispatching the ESS.
In contrast to [17], this paper seeks to investigate the effect of
different ownership arrangements of ESS in electricity markets
and how the potential benefits ESS can provide is affected by
selfish ESS operator behavior. This is important to analyze to
inform policy makers on how the ownership may impact clear-
ing prices and the associated market welfare, especially in cases
where storage operators may have significant knowledge of the
competitors and network parameters such in the case of util-
ity owned storage. In this paper we utilize PoA to compare
how the potential benefits of ESS is altered depending on dis-
patch strategy and the ambition of the ESS operator over a wide
range of system conditions. This is done to investigate potential
incentive problems for independently operated storage systems
in nodal markets.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
To model the influence of ESS on the LMP, the interaction
between the strategic bidder and MO is modelled through the
following bi-level optimization:
min
∑
t
∑
n
⎡
⎣∑
e∈ψn
λtn(P
chrg
te − P
dis
te )
−
∑
j∈ψn
∑
b
[
(λtn − C
s
jb)P
s
tjb
]⎤⎦ (1)
Subject to:
0 ≤ PEofferte ≤ P
essmax
e , ∀e, ∀t (2)
0 ≤ PEbidte ≤ P
essmax
e ε
out
e , ∀e, ∀t (3)
SoCmine ≤ SoC
0
e +
t∑
r=1
[
P chrgre ε
in
e −
P disre
εoute
]
∆t,∀e, ∀t (4)
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SoC0e +
t∑
r=1
[
P chrgre ε
in
e −
P disre
εoute
]
∆t ≤ SoCmaxe , ∀e, ∀t (5)
T∑
t=1
[
P chrgte ε
in
e −
P diste
εoute
]
∆t = 0, ∀e (6)
arg min
∑
t
∑
e
[
βdiste P
dis
te − β
chrg
te P
chrg
te
]
+
∑
t
∑
j
∑
b
[
βstjbP
s
tjb
]
+
∑
t
∑
i
∑
b
[CgibP
g
tib] (7)
Subject to:∑
i∈ψn
∑
b
P gtib +
∑
j∈ψn
∑
b
P stjb +
∑
e∈ψn
[
P diste − P
chrg
te
]
− P dtn
=
∑
m∈θn
Bnm(δtn − δtm) : (λtn), ∀n, ∀t (8)
0 ≤ P chrgte ≤ P
Eoffer
te : (µ
chrgmin
te , µ
chrgmax
te ), ∀e, ∀t (9)
0 ≤ P diste ≤ P
Ebid
te : (µ
dismin
te , µ
dismax
te ), ∀e, ∀t (10)
P g
min
ib ≤ P
g
tib ≤ P
gmax
ib : (µ
gmin
tib , µ
gmax
tib ), ∀t, ∀i, ∀b (11)
P s
min
jb ≤ P
s
tjb ≤ P
smax
jb : (µ
smin
tjb , µ
smax
tjb ), ∀t, ∀j, ∀b (12)
−Pmaxnm ≤Bnm(δtn−δtm)≤P
max
nm : (µ
lmin
tnm, µ
lmax
tnm),∀t,∀n,∀m
(13)
δminn ≤ δtn ≤ δ
max
n : (µ
δmin
tn , µ
δmax
tn ), ∀n, ∀t (14)
δtn = 0 : (λ
ref
t ), ∀t, n = 1 (15)
The upper level objective function (1) maximizes the differ-
ence between sell and buy price λtn of the energy bought by
the ESS. Profit maximization of conventional generators is also
enabled to evaluate the impact of strategic bidding of a portfo-
lio containing a mix of ESS and generators. In cases where the
strategic bidder only operates storage systems the set of strate-
gic generators J is empty. The set of non-strategic generators I
contains both conventional generators and RES.
Constraints (2) and (3) limit the power discharge and charge
rate to the capacity of the ESS through the offers and bids sub-
mitted to the MO. Constraint (4) and (5) bounds the State of
Charge (SoC) within the limits of the battery capability while
accounting for charging and discharging losses. To facilitate
scheduling of the ESS, (6) forces the SoC in period T to be
the equal to the initial SoC.
The lower level market clearing (7)–(15) is modelled as a
DC-Optimum Power Flow (DC-OPF). The objective function
(7) maximizes social welfare subject to the power balance at
each node (8). Constraints (9) and (10) limit the power dis-
charge and charge rate to the bids and offers of the ESS. Finally,
generator limits (11) and (12) are considered together with the
power line thermal limits (13) as well as bus voltage angle limits
(14) and (15).
No constraint is included to prohibit simultaneous charging
and discharging of the ESS. This is not required as a solution
where this occurs is sub-optimal and not chosen by the solver if
the round trip efficiency of the ESS is less than 1 and the costs
of all generators are positive as described in [24].
The dual variables associated with each constraint are given
in brackets next to each expression. Under LMP markets the
dual decision variable vector λtn associated with the nodal
power balance constraints (8) reflects the market clearing price
at each bus. This enables the ESS merchant to evaluate what
impact the ESS bids and offers will have on the market price
formation and hence submit bids that maximize (1).
A. Transformation to MPEC
The bi-level structure proposed above cannot be directly
applied in commercial mathematical programming solvers. To
resolve this, the lower level program (7)–(15) is represented
within the higher level problem by its Karush-Kuhn Tucker
(KKT) conditions to form a MPEC in a similar manner as [23],
[17] and [19]. To decrease the solution time further the com-
plementary slackness conditions and the non-linear upper level
objective function (1) is transformed to an equivalent linear
form using the methods previous used by [23]. The resulting
MILP is presented within Appendix A.
B. Welfare Maximization Considering LMP Formation
If the ESS is dispatched with the objective to minimize costs
through the lower level DC-OPF (7)–(15) its solution may
result in sub-optimal welfare as it does not account for the
LMP formation. To consider the impact of merchandizing sur-
plus and congestion on welfare, the price-based market clearing
approach used in [25] was modified to account for generator
profits on top of consumer costs. The resulting model used
here is identical to the MPEC (17)–(62) with the exception of
the objective function which is replaced by (63) presented in
Appendix B.
C. Price of Anarchy
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a way to quantify the loss of
efficiency in a system introduced from selfish behavior of the
market participant whose objectives may contradict the social
optimum solution. The concept is commonly used in trans-
portation and information networks [26], [27]. The issue of lost
welfare in the form of PoA from lack of coordination in decen-
tralized self-committed electricity markets are also discussed in
[28] and [29]. It is measured as a ratio between the worst case
equilibrium over the best possible solution and represents the
lack of coordination within the system, i.e.:
PoA =
Welfarestrategic −Welfarecentralized
Welfarecentralized
(16)
In this work PoA is used to illustrate the loss of welfare due
to selfish behavior of a strategic storage operator whose aim is
to maximize its profits.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
The proposed formulation was applied to the 6-bus network
shown in Fig. 1 and solved using Fico Xpress 7.7.
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Fig. 1. Six- Bus test system.
TABLE I
GENERATOR DATA
Six different scenarios are investigated as follows:
C1. No ESS installed in the system.
C2. ESS controlled by a strategic merchant using the MPEC
(17)–(62).
C3. ESS bidding at 0 $/MWh and optimized by the lower level
DC-OPF (7)–(15) to minimize costs.
C4. ESS dispatched by SO to maximize welfare using the
MPEC (18)–(62) with objective function (63) to account
for merchandizing surplus and congestion.
C5. ESS and strategic generator S1 controlled by a strategic
merchant using the MPEC (17)–(62).
C6. Same as C5, although no ESS is included in the system
and the strategic bidder only operates generators using the
MPEC (17)–(62).
Fig. 1 illustrates the location of generators and the peak load
at each bus. All lines have a reactance of 0.1 p.u. The generator
data provided in Table I are based on the IEEE RTS system [30].
Fig. 2 contains the load profile for the investigated day, which
is a based on the data provided in [30] for winter weekdays.
Fig. 2 also contains the power production of wind farm W1
which is chosen arbitrarily from a dataset of power output from
Burradale wind farm on the Shetland Islands. W1 bids in the
market at $0/MWh and has a rated power output of 200 MW.
The impact of forecast errors is not considered. Each ESS has
a charging and discharging efficiency of 90% and is rated at
50 MW, which is approximately 11% of peak load. Based on the
results of [31] the ESS energy to power ratio is sized to be able
to discharge at maximum power for four hours. It is assumed
that the ESS merchant has perfect knowledge of its competi-
tors’ technical constraints and costs to represent the worst case
scenario with regards to strategic behavior on market welfare
which is of interest when calculating PoA.
Fig. 2. Wind and demand data.
TABLE II
WELFARE IN UNCONGESTED 6-BUS SYSTEM
TABLE III
WELFARE IN CONGESTED 6-BUS SYSTEM
A. Results for the Uncongested Network
In the uncongested network, strategic bidding of the ESS
(case C2) results in only a marginal change in the clearing price
compared to the system without any storage (case C1), as the
ESS is not able to drive prices upwards during discharging or
downwards during charging. The two ESS are therefore dis-
patched to keep the clearing prices close to those in C1 to avoid
reducing the price volatility and arbitrage opportunity. Table II
presents the welfare and the distribution of this in terms of
generator profits, demand costs and merchandizing surplus for
C1–C6 in the uncongested system, while Table III presents the
same information for the congested system. The small change
in clearing price seen in Fig. 3 results in a reduced cost for
the demand during peak hours as well as an associated small
decrease in price volatility and increase in market welfare as
given in Table II. Note that the negative values of welfare in
Tables II and III are due to the inelastic demand.
When the ESS is co-optimized with the strategic generator in
C5 it still provides an improvement to market welfare over C6
where the strategic generator is operated alone. The dispatch
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Fig. 3. Clearing prices in uncongested network.
Fig. 4. ESS schedule in uncongested network for cases; (a) C2, (b) C3, (c) C4
and (d) C5.
schedule of C5 in Fig. 4 (d) differs from those of C2–C4 in
Fig. 4 (a)–(c), in that the ESS accepts a loss by charging during
hours 10 and 16 to increase the revenues of the strategic genera-
tor and total portfolio profits, rather than charging during hours
with low LMP.
When the ESS is dispatched to optimize market welfare the
storage displaces some of the more expensive generators dur-
ing hours 18–20 reflected by the deep discharge of ESS2 in
Fig. 4 (c). This reduces price volatility significantly from
10.9$/MWh to 0.33$/MWh, represented by σ in the legend of
Fig. 3. However the difference in dispatch between C3 and C4,
indicated in Fig. 4 (b) and (c), and the resulting clearing prices
in Fig. 3 shows that it is important to consider how the welfare
is distributed, and not only its total value. When looking at rows
five and seven for C2–C4 in Table II, it can be seen that they all
have the same objective value considering (63) and zero PoA.
Whereas this can be interpreted as no ESS market power, it is
not the case as the resulting clearing prices, given in Fig. 3, and
the distribution of welfare, from Table II, differ significantly.
B. Results for the Congested Network
In order to investigate the influence of network constraints on
ESS market power, the transfer capacity of the line connecting
N3 and N6 was limited to 250 MW and the capabilities of the
lines connecting buses N4, N5 and N6 were limited to 90 MW.
In the congested network the increased arbitrage opportu-
nity is reflected in increased price volatility represented by σ
in the legend of Fig. 5 and significant increase in ESS profits as
shown in Table III. The increased arbitrage opportunity is also
reflected by the more frequent and deeper cycling of the ESS
Fig. 5. Clearing prices in congested network with no ESS for; (a) C1 and
(b) C6.
Fig. 6. Clearing prices and ESS strategic schedule in the congested network:
(a) LMP in C2, (b) LMP in C5, (c) ESS discharge in C2 and (d) ESS discharge
in C5.
Fig. 7. Clearing prices and ESS schedule in congested network for dispatch to
maximize market welfare: (a) LMP in C3, (b) LMP in C4, (c) ESS discharge in
C3 and (d) ESS discharge in C4.
illustrated in Figs. 6 and 7 compared to the schedules provided
in Fig. 4.
The importance of ESS location can be seen in the differ-
ence in usage between ESS1 and ESS2 in Fig. 6 (c) and (d)
as well as Fig. 7 (c)–(d). In most cases ESS1 is used little due
to the limited price volatility at N3, reflected by the variance
of σ = 5.87$/MWh in Fig. 5 (a), whereas ESS2, located at
the highly volatile node N5 (σ = 15.16$/MWh), is used fre-
quently. The exception of the limited usage of ESS1 occurs
during price based marker clearing in C4. In this case both
ESS are cycled frequently and deeply in an alternating pattern,
where ESS1 charges when ESS2 discharges as seen in Fig. 7
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(d), to remove the congestion over the line between N3 and N6.
The resulting ESS dispatch removes all congestion in the net-
work increasing market welfare significantly at the expense of
the ESS accepting a larger loss. As all merchandizing surplus
is removed, all buses have equal LMPs as seen in Fig. 7 (b).
Furthermore, an overall reduction in price volatility can be seen
as represented by σ in the legend of Fig. 5
In C3, the welfare is reduced through the creation of addi-
tional merchandizing surplus compared to reference case, C1.
This leads to both increased costs of the demand and reduced
profits of generators.
In both C2 and C5 strategic ESS bidding increases welfare
and reduces the price volatility, with the additional welfare
being distributed between the generators and the consumers.
However, similarly to the uncongested network, this effect is
small in C2 and only a marginal change in LMP occurs as
the strategic operator does not wish to reduce the arbitrage
opportunity. The resulting loss of welfare from selfish ESS
behavior compared to C4 results in a PoA of over 48% as
presented in Table III. This indicates that the market price
signals do not provide the incentives for the ESS merchant to
reduce congestion. The impact of strategic bidding on LMP is
more prominent when ESS is co-optimized with the strategic
generator in C5 with a PoA of 78% and an even larger loss of
welfare equal to a PoA of 90% in C6 given in Table III. Notable
from this is that the ESS does not worsen the situation of the
selfish behavior of the strategic generator. Instead it reduces
the negative impact on market welfare by 12%. The strategic
bidder is able to dispatch its combined generator and storage
portfolio in a way that enables generator S1 and ESS2 at N5 to
be dispatched at relatively high levels without reducing clearing
prices by charging ESS1 during periods 19–21 as reflected in
Fig. 6 (d). Moreover, Fig. 6 (d) also shows that ESS2 at N5 is
charged during high price periods 7–8, 16 and 22–24 to allow
the strategic generator S1 to sell more energy at high LMP.
By doing this the total portfolio profit in C5 is increased as
the extra revenues collected by S1 is higher than the charging
and discharging losses of ESS2 as seen in Table III. Moreover,
the dispatch schedule results in an increase in LMP at nodes
N1–N3 during hours 19 and 21 reflected in Fig. 6 (b) compared
to Fig. 5 (b), which leads to an increase in consumer costs. Yet
the congestion in the system is also reduced which reduces the
value lost through merchandizing surplus seen in Table III, and
increases the overall market welfare.
V. CASE STUDY
The test cases C1–C6, applied to the small network in
Section IV, were also applied to the IEEE 24-bus RTS [30]. The
generator cost data is as described in the Matpower [32] data
file of the system. The system has been modified by constrain-
ing line 23, connecting buses 14 and 16, to 340 MW to create
congestion, and adding two 450 MW wind farms at nodes 5 and
17. The wind farm at bus 5 also creates congestion over the line
connecting buses 5 and 10 during low demand/high wind out-
put hours which means some wind needs to be curtailed during
these conditions. The wind capacity is equivalent to approxi-
mately 30% of peak demand. The RES output and load profiles
Fig. 8. Clearing prices in congested network with no ESS for; (a) C1 and
(b) C6.
TABLE IV
WELFARE IN CONGESTED IEEE RTS CASE
are the same as those presented in Fig. 2. The load at each bus
is assumed to follow the same load profile and the peak load of
each bus is as given in the IEEE 24-bus RTS system data. Four
ESS rated at 100 MW (approximately 14% of system peak load)
with 400 MWhr energy capacity are installed at the buses 5, 10,
11 and 14. These are the buses with the highest price volatil-
ity represented by σ in Fig. 8 (a) which indicates that the ESS
potentially could benefit most at these locations when perform-
ing arbitrage. Each of the ESS has a charging and discharging
efficiency of 90%. The generator located at bus 16 is owned and
operated by the storage merchant for the analysis in C5 and C6.
A. Results
With no ESS installed in the system in C1, the conges-
tion over the line connecting buses 14 and 16 creates a large
spread in prices raging form 18.281$/MWh at bus 22 to
78.36$/MWh at bus 14 during peak hours 18–20 as illustrated
in Fig. 8 (a). Prior to this a divergence in system prices can also
be noticed between 9am and 10am from curtailment of 86MWh
wind energy at bus 5 due to congestion over the power line con-
necting buses 5 and 10. This results in a drop to zero marginal
cost of supplying energy at the corresponding node 5 as the
excess of wind power serves the entire load behind the active
network constraint. Table IV presents the market welfare and
its distribution for the presented cases, C1–C6, in the modified
IEEE RTS system. Note that the negative generator profits for
C1–C4 are due to a large number of generators being operated
at their lower stable output limits.
When the ESS are introduced and operated strategically in
C2, similar patterns to those seen for the 6-bus system are
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Fig. 9. Clearing prices and ESS strategic schedule in the congested network:
(a) LMP in C2, (b) LMP in C5, (c) ESS discharge in C2 and (d) ESS discharge
in C5.
visible in terms of a slight improvement in welfare and reduc-
tion in consumer costs as seen in Table IV. The peak price at
node 14 is reduced from 78.36$/MWh to 74.58$/MWh due to
reduction in expensive peaking plant by discharging the ESS at
nodes 5, and 14 during peak hours. This enables better utiliza-
tion of low cost energy from base load plant and the otherwise
curtailed wind generator at bus 5. However from the results
given in Table IV it can be seen that the selfish behavior of
the ESS results in a PoA of 9.4% and decrease in welfare of
$98613 for the investigated day compared to C4. Furthermore,
the ESS dispatch in C2 reduces the curtailed wind energy at
bus 5 between 9 am and 10 am. Yet, the storage schedule pro-
vided in Fig. 9 (c) has not entirely removed the curtailment in
order to keep the nodal price at 0$/MWh and let the ESS charge
with free energy as seen in Fig. 9 (a). It is also worth noting
that the storage at nodes 5 and 14 are cycled fairly deeply, as
seen in Fig. 9 (c), while the other ESS at nodes 10 and 11
only use about 20% of their capacity at most, as discharging
deeper would have a more prominent reduction in arbitrage
opportunity by significantly reducing nodal electricity prices
at the affected buses. The effect of the latter is visible in C3
illustrated in Fig.10 (a) and (c) where the system LMPs are
nearly flattened by offsetting peak plant, absorbing all curtailed
wind energy and discharging all four ESS close to their rated
capacity. Furthermore, when comparing the profits of the ESS
merchant between C2 and C3 it is clear that the benefits the ESS
provide in C3 results in a “self-cannibalism” behavior where
the system efficiency savings provided by the ESS from deep
cycling reduces the price volatility and the revenue collected
by the storage merchant. This indicates incentive problems for
ESS in LMP based markets, where the rewards of providing
additional storage capacity may disappear when it is needed
the most. Consequently, other revenue streams such as capacity
payments may be more suitable forms of payments for privately
owned ESS in energy markets to ensure that the ESS operator
is not penalized by supporting the wider welfare of the system.
In contrast to the 6-bus system the marginal bidding of the
ESS in C3 does not cause any problem with increased con-
gestion. Instead, the ESS schedule, and resulting LMPs, are
Fig. 10. Clearing prices and ESS schedule in congested network for dispatch
to maximize market welfare: (a) LMP in C3, (b) LMP in C4, (c) ESS discharge
in C3 and (d) ESS discharge in C4.
similar to those seen in C4 when comparing Fig. 10 (a) and (b),
although the latter is slightly more efficient by anticipating the
divergence in LMP and dispatching the ESS to avoid this and
remove all network congestion. This results in the same clearing
price for all nodes with low price variance of σ = 1.55$/MWh
as seen in Fig. 10 (b). Similarly to the 6-bus system the ESS
receives negative profits when operated to maximize welfare
through price based market clearing in C4, which again high-
lights the need for other payment mechanisms if the full benefit
of the ESS is to be realized.
In contrast to C2, the cases where the generator located at
bus 16 is operated strategically (C5 and C6) has a more promi-
nent impact on distribution of market welfare. In these cases the
total welfare is improved compared to C2 by reducing system
congestion illustrated by the drop in merchandizing surplus and
decreased PoA in Table IV. This occurs as the strategic gener-
ator located at bus 16 is aware of the higher LMPs on the other
side of the constrained line between buses 14 and 16, and uses
this knowledge to increase its bids to equal that of the marginal
generator located at bus 13 (which is on the other side of the
congested line) to maximize profits. Yet, the distribution of wel-
fare is also altered. In both C5 and C6 the consumer costs are
increased, whereas generator profits are improved significantly,
as seen in Table IV. However, when the ESS and generators
are co-optimized in C5 the severity of these negative effects are
softened as illustrated by the drop in PoA of 3.8% (compared to
C6) seen in Table IV. In contrast to the 6-bus illustrative exam-
ple, no charging of ESS is conducted during peak hours as the
strategic generator is able to dispatch its entire capacity either
way. This leaves additional profit opportunity for the ESS that
can be realized by discharging at high LMP rather than enabling
the generator to sell more high cost energy.
B. Distribution of PoA Over Different System Conditions
To investigate the spread in welfare from selfish ESS behav-
ior during different system conditions, PoA was calculated for
the modified IEEE RTS system considering possible single
generator and line failures (N-1 contingencies). In addition,
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Fig. 11. Spread of PoA in; (a) C3–ESS strategic bidding, (b) C5–ESS and
generator strategic bidding and (c) C6–Strategic generator only.
Fig. 12. Spread of PoA depending on merchandizing surplus in IEEE RTS.
time series data for wind speed at each of the two wind farms
is generated through Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) using
an ARMA (1,1) model with autoregressive parameter 1.0073,
moving average factor 0.0327, and a zero mean error with stan-
dard deviation 0.1372. The wind speed data is converted using
a simplified wind power curve with cut-in wind speed 4 m/s,
rated wind speed 10 m/s and cut-out wind speed 25 m/s. The
power output is assumed to vary linearly with wind speed over
the variable speed region between 4 m/s and 10 m/s.
The spread of PoA in the investigated system is shown in
Fig. 11. The average and worst case PoA are 2.58% and 17.98%
for C3, 1.74% and 11.86% for C5, as well as 2.30% and 11.16%
for C6. Similar to the results described in Section IV, and
V-A, it can be seen that the ESS reduces the negative impact
of the strategic generator. As the network is less congested
compared to the 6-bus system presented in Section IV of this
paper, the PoA is also lower. The strong influence of conges-
tion on PoA is further shown in Fig. 12, where the congestion
is represented on the x-axis by the ratio between merchandizing
surplus and total system welfare before the ESS and strate-
gic generators are introduced (C1). The increase in PoA with
increased merchandizing surplus is expected, as the increased
congestion tends to increase price volatility. Furthermore, the
possible improvement by dispatching storage to maximize wel-
fare (C4) is larger, as well as the disincentive for strategic ESS
operators to dispatch the storage to reduce price volatility as
commented on in Section IV and V-A. No strong trend was vis-
ible between curtailed wind power and PoA in the investigated
systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
Similar to previous work on strategic ESS behavior this work
supports the claim that strategic bidding does not impact mar-
ket welfare negatively compared to when no storage is installed
in the system. Moreover, this work concludes that the same
behavior is present when the ESS is operated strategically as
part of a portfolio that also includes conventional generators.
However, in contrast to previous work, this paper illustrates that
ESS merchants may be penalized if operating their assets in a
manner that optimizes system efficiency. Storage operators are
instead incentivized to withhold some of their capacity during
times when it will improve welfare the most, to retain the price
volatility required to maximize profits. The welfare lost due to
selfish ESS behavior grows with increased network congestion,
which is likely to lead to sub-optimal reduction in congestion
and RES curtailment. If the ESS is owned by a NO or SO, price
based market clearing with the objective to maximize welfare
may better improve market efficiency. Such arrangements are
however not allowed under current ESS classification due to the
unbundling principle applied in most electricity markets today.
This raises the question of whether ESS ownership arrange-
ments should be revisited and/or what support mechanisms
and contract options may be most appropriate to reward mer-
chants to support the wider system benefits. Capacity contracts
where the merchant is compensated through fixed payments for
its services may be more appropriate. Such arrangements may
also improve certainty in ESS revenues that may offer better
investment signals to potential ESS projects.
APPENDIX A
The final single level MILP for ESS profit maximization
(17)–(62) is presented below.
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APPENDIX B
The objective function for price based welfare maximization
(63) is presented below.
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